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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Increasingly, states are turning to so-called “user fees” and surcharges to underwrite criminal justice costs and
close budget gaps. In this report, we focus on Florida, a state that relies so heavily on fees to fund its courts
that observers have coined a term for it – “cash register justice.” Since 1996, Florida added more than 20 new
categories of financial obligations for criminal defendants and, at the same time, eliminated most exemptions
for those who cannot pay. The fee increases have not been accompanied by any evident consideration of
their hidden costs: the cumulative impacts on those required to pay, the ways in which the debt can lead to
new offenses, and the costs to counties, clerks and courts of collection mechanisms that fail to exempt those
unable to pay.
This report examines the impact of the Florida Legislature’s decision to levy more user fees on persons accused and convicted of crimes, without providing exemptions for the indigent. Its conclusions are troubling.
Florida relies heavily on fees to underwrite its criminal justice system and, at times, uses monies generated
by fees to subsidize general revenue. In many cases, the debts are uncollectible; performance standards for
court clerks, for example, expect that only 9 percent of fees levied in felony cases will be collected. Yet, aggressive collection practices result in a range of collateral consequences. Missed payments produce more fees.
Unpaid costs prompt the suspension of driving privileges (and, relatedly, the ability to get to work).
Moreover, collection practices are not uniform across the state. Court clerks have most of the responsibility.
In some judicial circuits, the courts themselves take a more active role. At their worst, collection practices
can lead to a new variation of “debtors’ prison” when individuals are arrested and incarcerated for failing to
appear in court to explain missed payments.
As most prisons and jails are at capacity, and unemployment and economic hardship are widespread, it is
time to consider whether heaping more debt on those unable to afford it is a sensible approach to financing
essential state functions.

key findings
1.

Florida increasingly relies on fees to finance core government functions. The Legislature has added
more than 20 new categories of legal financial obligations (“LFOs”) to the criminal justice process since
1996. The state has acted without considering the effects of the new LFOs and without examining whether
cumulative debt promotes recidivism or otherwise hinders reentry into society for those convicted of crimes.

2.

The Legislature has eliminated exemptions for the indigent, thus demanding revenue from a population unable to afford payment. Florida ignores inability to pay when imposing LFOs, considers inability
to pay, in theory, when collecting LFOs, but bypasses the requirement in practice. For example, Florida law
permits the indigent to pay off debt through community service, but most courts have no such programs.

3.

Despite rising pressure to collect fees, little attention is paid to the costs of collection. As courts
become more reliant on fee revenue, clerks’ offices are, increasingly, under pressure to step up the collections process. Yet, state performance standards only look at one side of the ledger – the revenue raised –
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and fail to assess the costs and consequences of collection efforts. Some counties also incur hidden costs
in budgets for sheriffs, local jails, and clerk operations.
4.

The current fee system creates a self-perpetuating cycle of debt for persons re-entering society
after incarceration. Fee amounts are often unpayable on limited budgets. Missed payments prompt
additional fees and create a mounting debt cycle.

5.

Collection practices in some counties create a new form of debtors’ prison. In some counties,
courts arrest individuals who miss court dates scheduled to discuss LFO debt, disrupting lives and
employment. This practice resulted in more than 800 arrests and more than 20,000 hours of jail time
in Leon County alone in one year. The arrests and nights spent in already overcrowded local jails cost
the public money.

6.

Florida routinely suspends driver’s licenses for failure to make payments, a practice that sets the
debtor up for a vicious cycle of “driving with a suspended license” convictions.

7.

Florida allows private debt collection firms to add up to a 40 percent surcharge on unpaid court
debt. Recent legislation requires courts to refer outstanding debt to collection agencies, which can
add up to a 40 percent surcharge on existing debt.

recommendations
In light of these findings the Brennan Center makes the following recommendations for immediate and
longer-term steps for Florida officials to address the hidden costs of fee collection.

Immediate steps:
1.

The Legislature should exempt indigent defendants from LFOs. An exemption system based on a
rational determination of ability to pay would free officials from the burden of pursing non-existent
revenue and would relieve financial pressure on previously incarcerated individuals who are attempting
to re-enter society. In light of the fact that performance standards expect only a 9 percent collection
rate for felonies, an indigency exemption in felony cases would result in little lost revenue.

2.

Payment plans should be tailored to an individual’s ability to pay, as state law already requires.
At minimum, the courts should follow the state law that presumes a person is unable to pay more
than 2 percent of average monthly income when setting payment plans. Similarly, the Department
of Corrections should sync monthly payments to income and should fully exempt the indigent from
monthly probation supervision fees, consistent with existing state law.

3.

Florida’s Supreme Court should adopt court rules to end the new debtors’ prison. In the absence
of a prior finding that an individual can pay fees, courts should not authorize incarceration for failure
to appear at LFO debt hearings. This would be consistent with the rules that apply to those who
have failed to pay child support. The Court should also adopt rules to ensure that incarceration for
contempt does not occur as a result of inability to pay.
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4.

Counties can save money by eliminating debt-related arrests for failure to appear and resulting
incarceration in already overcrowded local jails. In the absence of a statewide rule, counties with
collections hearings can change local practices to eliminate these arrests and jail stays, which are unrelated to public safety and cost taxpayers money.

5.

Florida should provide counsel in all collections or LFO-related collection contempt proceedings
that may result in incarceration. It should not be possible to end up in prison for LFO debt without
having been represented by counsel.

6.

Courts should offer community service programs that build job skills to all those who cannot
viably afford to repay fees. While state law authorizes community service as an alternative to payment for those unable to pay, very few courts actually provide this option.

7.

The performance standards used to evaluate court clerks should be based on collection costs as
well as collection rates. Current practice only looks at one side of the ledger – the revenue raised –
without considering the expenses of collection. Performance standards should also include compliance
with state law and constitutional requirements related to collection of fees.

8.

Court clerks should suspend driver’s licenses only in those cases in which an individual can afford to repay court debt but refuses to do so. In addition, the Legislature should create a conditional driver’s license that permits driving to and from work for those whose licenses have been suspended.

9.

The Legislature should limit service charges by private debt collectors and ensure adequate oversight. Once court debt is turned over to private firms for collection, the amount owed increases as
surcharges are added, yet current oversight of collection practices is scant.

Longer-term reforms:
1.

The Legislature should reconsider levying LFOs in felony cases – in which collection rates are
extremely low, in any event – without a full understanding of how the debt may affect an individual’s attempt to re-enter his/her community. People with felony convictions are likely to have
limited financial and employment prospects; increased debt burden after release from prison may well
increase the risk of recidivism.

2.

Reforms must ensure that counties and others do not bear hidden costs of state revenue collection. For a number of counties, the fee system requires expenditures for collections, particularly
the arrest and incarceration of non-payers, and increases the dockets of their already overburdened
court systems. These costs are passed on to taxpayers at the local level. While the state gets a revenue
enhancement from fee collection, the ledger sheet for other Floridians may well be in the red. A new
source of revenue only works if it does not result in hidden costs. Counties and other stakeholders
should be engaged to determine if the revenue enhancement of the existing system outweighs the costs
of collection, both actual as well as social, and the fee system should be reformed accordingly.
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i.

introduction
Florida funds its criminal justice system, in part, with user fees from those who pass through the system. Reliance on these fees may help relieve government of tough budget choices, but it extracts a price. The price is
particularly high when the “users” are criminal defendants who are likely to be indigent, and therefore unable
to pay, and who may be facing multiple barriers to reentering society.
This report tracks Florida’s increasing dependence on criminal justice fees, examines methods used to collect those fees, and discusses the implications for those obligated to pay and for the public at large. As the
economic downturn strains budgets for even the more well-off, and unemployment levels hover around 10
percent,1 it is time to question whether relying on the collection of fees from those with very limited means is
a sensible way to fund essential state functions.

It is time to question whether relying on
the collection of fees from those with very
limited means is a sensible way to fund
essential state functions.

Florida’s increasing reliance on fee revenue coincides
with rising concern about policies that affect the massive numbers of Floridians with criminal convictions
and, in particular, those who have been incarcerated
and are transitioning to life outside prison. Florida
has the third-largest prison population of any state.2
Nearly 90 percent of the more than 100,000 people currently in Florida’s state prisons3 will be released, and,
if past trends persist, nearly one-third will be re-incarcerated for a new crime.4 Those in Florida prisons – and
in prisons throughout the country – are largely indigent and face considerable difficulties as they attempt
to transition from prison back into the general population. On average, Florida state prison inmates read
at a sixth grade level.5 Nearly 70 percent read below the level necessary to begin studying for a GED, ninth
grade.6 Low education rates correlate to low incomes.7
Furthering inhibiting reentry prospects, a large portion of the prison population suffers from physical and
mental illnesses that hinder their employment chances – and their ability to pay criminal justice debts – after
release. More than 60 percent of state prison inmates in Florida have a history of substance abuse.8 Treatment for substance abuse is in short supply: as of 2007, only 27 of the 123 Florida Department of Corrections (“FDC”) facilities had treatment programs.9 Available treatment for mental illness is in similarly short
supply.
Court-imposed fees and fines affect not only Floridians sentenced to state prison, but also those convicted
of misdemeanors and criminal traffic violations, many of whom are sentenced to county or court probation
on the condition that they pay legal financial obligations. It is hard to gather definitive statistics on this
group, but it is clearly a significant number of people. In 2008, the Florida Department of Highway Safety
and Motor Vehicles reported 247,115 convictions for criminal traffic violations.10 For most people, a traffic
violation fine is a nuisance, but not a significant cost. For low-income individuals, however, one ticket for
driving with a suspended license can trigger a vicious cycle of court-ordered fees, followed by failure to pay,
which can lead to more fees, more unlicensed driving, and sometimes incarceration.
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ii.

growing use of legal financial obligations
From 1996 through 2007, the Florida Legislature created or authorized more than 20 new categories of legal
financial obligations (“LFOs”) – surcharges, fees, and other monetary obligations – related to criminal cases
and violations. Many of these surcharges and fees have been increased during the last two years. These LFOs
range from an application fee for the constitutionally required public defender – a fee that applies to those
who have merely been charged with, and not yet convicted of, any crime – to a fee repaying the costs of one’s
prosecution. These fees have been added continuously without any apparent consideration of their cumulative impacts on reentry or recidivism.

Legislative Action Expanding Court-Related Debt (1997-2009)11
$40 application fee for public defender created.12
1996

$3 cost assessed against anyone convicted of a crime; funds used to pay for teen court.13
Authorized counties to create $20-$50 court cost to fund local crime prevention.14
Authorized local jails to charge inmates for subsistence costs.15
$135 court cost for driving under the influence created.16

1997

$100 cost for controlled substance violation to fund crime labs created.17

1998

$20 crime stoppers fund surcharge added.19

1999

None added.

2000

None added.

2001

$201 surcharge imposed on assault, battery, domestic violence and other convictions to fund
domestic violence programs.20

2002

Additional surcharge of up to the amount of underlying fine for drug and alcohol offenses authorized
to fund drug and alcohol treatment and education.18

Mandated restitution in cases of theft of more than $1000 from someone sixty-five or older.21
$135 court cost expanded to apply to those charged with “boating under the influence.”22
$151 surcharge imposed on assault, battery, and other convictions to fund rape crisis centers.23

2003

Eliminated ability of court to waive $50 offender fee.24
Increased service charge for getting driver’s license reinstated after a period of revocation from $25 to
up to $37.50.25
$101 court cost added for crimes against minors.26
$15 surcharge imposed for criminal traffic violations.27

2004

Authorized counties to impose up to $65 in court costs for all those convicted of crimes or criminal
traffic offenses.28
$40 fee imposed for contesting alleged violation of local ordinances in county court.29
Increased maximum service charge for getting driver’s license reinstated after a period of revocation
to $47.50 from $37.50.30
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$10 fee added for alleged violation of local ordinances processed in county court, to be applied when
not contesting violation.31
2005

Authorized certain local governments to impose non-waivable $15 surcharge for criminal traffic
violations.32
Authorized certain local governments to impose $85 local surcharge for all offenses.33

2006
2007

Created discretionary restitution for damage or loss caused by a juvenile’s offense.34
Mandatory restitution imposed for motor vehicle crashes that result in injury or death.35
$3 surcharge imposed for all criminal traffic offenses and noncriminal traffic violations.36
Increased application fee for public defender to $50 from $40.37
Increased to $60 from $50 court cost for misdemeanors and criminal traffic offenses; to $225 from
$200 court cost for felonies.38

2008

Required costs of prosecution (minimum $50 for misdemeanors, $100 for felonies) to be imposed
on convicted persons regardless of ability to pay.39
Set minimum recoupment fees for persons who use public defender at $50 for misdemeanors, $100
for felonies, and mandated recoupment notwithstanding defendant’s present ability to pay.40
Increased court cost for crimes against minors to $151 from $101.41
Increased authorization for local surcharge for criminal traffic violations to $30 from $15.42

2009

Increased service charge for getting driver’s license reinstated after revocation to $60 from $47.50.43
Made it mandatory for clerks to refer fees, service charges, fines, court costs, and certain liens that
remain unpaid after 90 days to a private attorney or collection agent.44

A.

Florida Law Produces a Confusing and Broad Range of LFOs

We provide a chart in the Appendix that shows the dizzying breadth of Florida’s legally authorized, everexpanding list of LFOs. As the chart makes clear, Florida imposes a vast number of LFOs on criminal
defendants as they move through the criminal justice system. These LFOs generally fall into three distinct
categories: fines, restitution, or “user fees.” The last is the most rapidly expanding category and is used to
generate revenue for the state.
Fines are imposed by the court as part of the judgment and sentence and are used to punish convicted offenders. Pursuant to statute, fines correlate, generally, to the severity of the crime involved. Historically, the
bulk of the fines collected were deposited into accounts that circuit clerks used to finance their operations.
But, recent legislative changes centralized oversight under the state’s Justice Administrative Commission and
created the general “Clerks of the Court Trust Fund.”45
Restitution requirements differ from fines in that they are intended to compensate for costs incurred as a
result of the crime.46 Restitution can total in the thousands of dollars and, for those against whom it is assessed, it is often the single, largest financial obligation. Payment of restitution typically becomes a condition
of probation (or other supervision) and takes precedence over almost all other financial obligations. Full
payment of restitution is also a prerequisite for the restoration of civil rights, which include the right to vote,
serve on a jury, and obtain a wide range of occupational licenses that can lead to steady work.47 The restitution requirement has proved a major impediment to the operation of what was intended to be an automatic
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process to restore the civil rights of non-violent offenders: a 2007 Florida Department of Corrections analysis of 80,000 individual cases awaiting rights restoration showed that nearly 40 percent would be ineligible
due to unpaid restitution.48
“User fees” comprise the fastest growing and largest
Currently, Florida’s “user fees” include a
category of LFOs. Some are authorized by statute to
fee to apply for a constitutionally mandated
finance specific court costs; others may be imposed by
public defender. Florida does not waive
counties; still others are imposed for particular offenses
this fee for the indigent.
and revenue is deposited in designated state trust funds.
The state justifies these fees on the grounds that it needs
the funds involved to adjudicate individuals’ cases and administer punishments; however, at times, the revenue collected goes toward unrelated state functions. Currently, Florida’s “user fees” include a fee to apply
for one’s constitutionally mandated public defender, fees to reimburse the costs of one’s prosecution, fees for
the costs of one’s public defense, and numerous other court costs. Fees authorized to recoup the costs of
punishment include room and board costs, fees for medical care, probation supervision fees, substance abuse
treatment costs, and the costs for other conditions of probation, such as electronic monitoring and urinalysis.
In addition, many private companies that provide treatment services to probationers charge fees for their
services, attendance at which is required as a condition of probation.

B.

Florida Has Eliminated Exemptions Traditionally Granted to Those Who Cannot
Afford to Pay

As the state has become more reliant on fees, it has eliminated most exemptions for those unable to pay. In
recent years, the Legislature mandated that defendants pay the costs of their prosecution and public defense,
regardless of their ability to pay.
The lack of exemptions for the indigent raises constitutional concerns. Florida’s Supreme Court has ruled
that fees may be imposed initially, regardless of ability to pay, but that the state must make the determination
of ability to pay prior to collection.49 However, as a practical matter, fees are imposed at sentencing and collection typically commences without further opportunity for a judicial determination of ability to pay.
Nor does Florida waive the $50 public defender application fee for the indigent.50 This practice, too, raises
serious constitutional concerns, is out of step with practice in other states, and violates American Bar Association guidelines.51 Although a number of other states charge application fees for public defenders, Florida is
one of only two states of which we are aware (the other being North Carolina) that do not include an explicit
waiver of the fee if a defendant is found to be indigent.52 Instead, if a defendant cannot pay the fee, the statute provides that the trial court will assess the fee as part of sentencing or as a condition of probation.53
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a public defender application fee can be constitutionally
permissible, but only if the law establishing it is carefully designed to reach only those defendants who are
able to pay the fee and not those who would suffer a “manifest hardship” as a result of it.54 In 2004, Minnesota’s Supreme Court struck down a fee similar to Florida’s because if failed to include a waiver provision.55
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Yet, in Florida, the law remains on the books and provides no opportunity for waiver. Indeed, there was even
talk in the Legislature in January 2010 of further raising the fee.
As a result of the lack of waivers for the indigent, communities invest significant resources pursuing debts that
will never be collected. Statewide performance standards implicitly acknowledge as much, expecting that
only 9 percent of the LFOs assessed in Circuit Criminal cases (those involving felonies) will be collected.56
However, as described further infra, even when the money is never seen by the court system, collection efforts
hobble the chance that persons with convictions can successfully reenter society and avoid reoffending.
Finally, even when the Legislature has authorized exemptions for those unable to pay, there is evidence that
such exemptions are not enforced fully in practice. For example, individuals who are on probation or under other forms of supervision are required to pay a monthly fee – generally $103.72 for probationers and
$124.71 for those in “community control” supervision.57 The Department of Corrections is authorized to
exempt, fully or partially, those who are unable to pay because of disability, inability to obtain a job or other
reasons.58 However, the general practice is to provide only partial exemptions by lowering the monthly rate
to $50 rather than providing full exemptions.59

C.

LFOs Sometimes Subsidize Other Government Functions, Including
General Revenue

The Legislature has directed that some of the revenue collected through these LFOs be used to finance state
functions related, in some way, to the underlying offense. However, it also created LFOs to cover state functions wholly unrelated to the underlying offense. In these instances, money is collected ostensibly to fund a
particular government function but, in fact, used to subsidize another. This converts the charge into something that is closer to a tax than to a true “user fee.”
For example, the court imposes a $135 fee on those who drive a boat under the influence, but not a single
penny of this sum goes to the courts. Rather the legislature directs that the money be divided between an
emergency medical services trust fund, the statewide crime lab system, and a brain and spinal cord injury rehabilitation trust fund.60 The mandatory $500 penalty imposed on those who solicit prostitution is another
example. The $500 collected for this offense is used for the “sole purpose of paying the administrative costs
of treatment-based drug court programs.”61
To be sure, all of these programs are worthy. However, it is questionable whether criminal defendants are the
optimal funding source for these programs when the law does not include exemptions for the indigent.
Some fees go directly to the state’s general revenue fund to subsidize the state’s overall budget. These include
the fees paid to the Department of Corrections for supervision of persons on probation and other forms of
supervision.62 Again, such fees function more like a tax than a user fee.
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D.

Increasing Pressure on Courts to Raise Funds

The rising number of LFOs corresponds to the court system’s increasing reliance on LFOs to make ends
meet. Florida has no personal income tax63 and relies on the state sales tax64 for more than three-quarters
of its revenue.65 From October 2007 to September 2008, court clerks collected $885.5 million, of which
$180.2 million, or 20 percent, was collected from criminal cases in the circuit and county courts.66
In 1998, Florida voters approved a state constitutional revision that shifted responsibility for funding the
state court system from the counties to the state. “Revision 7” to Article V of the Florida Constitution
explicitly requires that clerks’ offices for county and circuit courts be funded by court fees and filing costs.67
Until last year, clerks could draw directly on fee and fine revenue to fund their budgets directly.68 But now,
as a result of 2009 legislative changes designed to increase state oversight of clerk budgets, 90 percent of all
court-related fines, fees, service charges, and costs collected by court clerks must be deposited into the Clerks
of the Court Trust Fund within the state’s Justice Administrative Commission. The remaining 10 percent of
all court-related fines may be used by the clerk for operational needs and program enhancements.69
However, increased state oversight is likely to result in increased pressure to collect. Under the amended provisions, each clerk of court must submit a budget request to the state Clerk of Court Operations Corporation
(“CCOC”) – a legislatively created entity that oversees clerk operations under state oversight.70 Those budget requests must include a projection of all court-related fees that will be collected.71 If a clerk’s projected
budget is higher than the projected fee revenue, the clerk is supposed to raise court-related fee amounts, as
permitted by law.72
The CCOC also sets performance standards to measure clerks’ success in collecting fee revenue.73 Collection rates in most civil cases are expected to be quite high, 90 percent.74 However, expected collection rates
for criminal cases are much lower. Misdemeanors are supposed to yield 40 percent collection rates. The
expected rate for felony and juvenile cases is a mere 9 percent, an acknowledgement of how hard it is to collect from these groups.
The CCOC also examines the expenditures of clerks’ offices but does not collect data on how much it costs
to collect various fees. It would be particularly valuable to learn how much money clerks’ offices spend to
collect fees from juveniles and those convicted of felonies. There is a clear human toll exacted in connection
with the imposition of debt on these groups and the collection rates are low; given this, data on cost of fee
collection broken down by these categories would shed light on the question of whether it is cost-effective to
collect from these groups at all.
Structural reliance on fees to fund court operations goes against best practices recommended by the American Bar Association, the National Center for State Courts, and other justice experts, who have cautioned
against relying on fees to create self-supporting court operations. Chief among these concerns are the facts
that dependence on court fees interferes with the judiciary’s independent constitutional role, diverts the
courts’ attention from their essential functions, and threatens the impartiality of judges and other court
personnel with personal or institutional, pecuniary incentives.75
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State Attorney Conditions Plea Bargains on Payment of Fees
The heavy reliance on fees also creates incentives for players in the justice system to take collection
matters into their own hands.
In the Second Judicial Circuit, the state attorney’s office has instituted a practice of collecting the costs
of prosecution fee – typically $50 for a misdemeanor and $100 for a felony – directly from defendants
as a condition of entering plea bargains, and then keeping the funds for itself. From the summer of
2008 onward, notes from staff meetings reveal that the state attorney advised staff to request the fee
directly from defendants so that all the monies paid would go directly into the state attorney’s office.76
State law, however, provides that payments in any court case are to be collected and dispensed by the
court clerk and then distributed according to priorities set by the Legislature.77 For example, state law
requires that the clerk “assign the first $50 of any fees or costs paid by an indigent person” as payment
of the public defender application fee, which funds indigent defense.78 Thus, by bypassing the clerk’s
office, the state attorney was able to capture the first $50 or $100 collected from each defendant rather
than dividing the revenue among other legislatively set priorities.
Additionally, when the state attorney’s office was unable to collect fees up-front from defendants,
prosecutors would request that the court order costs of prosecution fees be paid within a certain period of time regardless of the defendant’s ability to pay.
Linking plea agreements to the defendant’s payment of fees raises serious concerns about the use of
prosecutorial discretion to raise funds rather than further justice and public safety. By October 2008,
about three months after beginning this practice, the state attorney’s office had directly collected
$24,903 from defendants solely from prosecution fees.79 As this report goes to press, the practice is
ongoing.

iii.

lfos str ain individual limited budgets
All of these obligations – which are imposed at various stages in the criminal justice process – constitute substantial burdens for individuals who are poor or unemployed. One reentry advocate who runs a residential
program for former prisoners returning to the community reports that about 80 percent of his clients have
legal financial obligations and estimates that they range from about $100 to $300 a month.80 Another reentry advocate, who provides legal assistance to people who have been incarcerated, estimates that her clients
who are on probation or other supervision owe about $100 a month to supervision authorities, and are likely
to face a host of additional monthly fees depending on their charges.81
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Further research is needed to determine the precise average amount owed by individuals with criminal convictions. In an informal survey of 35 persons who emerged from prison in the spring of 2008, the Brennan
Center found an average debt of $772.23 (excluding the two highest and lowest amounts) and a median
debt of $498. These debts derived solely from the individuals’ court cases and did not include additional
supervision costs imposed upon release. Most individuals surveyed did not know the correct amount that
they owed.82
In a 2005 internal analysis, the Florida Department of Corrections found that 21.2 percent of defendants
under the department’s supervision owed restitution.83 Of that group, the 22,379 individuals who were on
probation, parole or other forms of community supervision, owed an average of $17,872 in restitution.84
However, the analysis cautioned, the number is distorted by the fact that 367 of those individuals owed hundreds of thousands, or even millions. Excluding the group with extraordinarily high restitution amounts,
the average restitution debt owed by the remaining 22,012 individuals was $8,195.85 More than 40 percent
of those who owed restitution owed less than $500.86 These figures were confined to restitution only and do
not include court-ordered fines, fees and other surcharges that comprise an individual’s total debt.
These debts are borne by individuals with limited financial means. According to FDC, the average monthly
income for individuals on probation or under other forms of community supervision was $1,411 in 2005,
which would be $1,559 in today’s dollars, adjusted for inflation.87 LFOs aside, this sum barely covers a
person’s basic housing, food, transportation, and health care needs, to say nothing of expenses for child care
and other extra costs. A single adult in Leon County, requires $1,530 per month to cover the most basic
expenses.88 Thus, probationers – who on average earn just $30 more than the sum needed to cover basic
monthly expenses – struggle to get by, even before paying a nickel toward LFOs. If an individual owed $75
per month in LFOs – the amount typically demanded by the Leon County Collections Court from those
with felony convictions89 – that amount would lower the average probationer’s income below the basic selfsufficiency level. For a Leon County adult, $75 could cover one-third of monthly food and housing costs,
or almost 60 percent of monthly healthcare expenses (see Table 1).90 A slightly higher monthly LFO debt,
for example $100, would constitute 46 percent of monthly food expenses, 77 percent of monthly healthcare
expenses, and 42 percent of monthly transportation expenses (see Table 1).91

Table 1: Leon County (Tallahassee) Household Expenses92
Monthly Cost for a Single
Adult (no dependants)

$75 as % of
Monthly Cost

$100 as % of Monthly
Cost

Housing

$618

12%

16%

Food

$218

34%

46%

Transportation

$236

32%

42%

Healthcare

$130

58%

77%

Miscellaneous

$120

63%

83%

Taxes

$208

36%

48%

$1,530

5%

7%

Budget Item

Monthly Total
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Harold Branning’s experience dramatizes the difficulties involved in LFO costs.93 Branning discovered, on
his release from prison in August of 2007, that he owed more than $7000 in court fines, fees, and restitution.
As a condition of probation, he was ordered to make monthly payments of about $250, an amount that was
later raised to $391.
Branning says he was only able to make these payments with the help of House of Hope, a religious mission in Gainesville that provides job training and placement, community, and partially subsidized room and
board to individuals recently released from prison. At House of Hope, Branning was fortunate to pay only
$50 a week for rent and only $30 a week for food – significantly less than he would have paid on his own.
Still, Branning describes the debt as a source of great stress. Just after his release, his income from the mission
was $303 a week. After his probation fee ($62.50 a week) and the fee for mandatory aftercare required as
part of his probation ($20 a week), he had only $220 left to cover the rest of his living expenses. In keeping
with House of Hope’s mission, he tithed 10% of his
weekly paycheck to those even poorer than himself
The average income for individuals on
and paid surcharges to cash his paycheck and purchase
money orders for his required probation payments.
probation barely covers the most basic
After these payments, Branning was left with less than
expenses. Probationers struggle to get by,
$100 a week for basic expenses.
even before paying a nickel toward LFOs.
Branning was fortunate, however, in that he obtained
a job with House of Hope’s help and was therefore able to complete probation and make his payments. But,
he explains that paying the debt was difficult given his income, saying “not everyone is able to excel like I
did.” Now he works at House of Hope and helps others with post-prison needs, worries, and debt.
Court fees are collected against the backdrop of other significant financial obligations faced by those reentering society. In Florida, as in about half the states, child support payments continue to accrue while a
non-custodial parent is incarcerated.94 To modify a child support order in Florida, the non-custodial parent
must show an involuntary change in circumstances that has resulted in his inability to make payments. Incarceration is not sufficient to modify child support orders, non-custodial parents in Florida’s prison system
emerge from prison with substantial child support debt. Studies on the national level have shown that child
support obligations typically range from $225 to $300 per month for a formerly incarcerated person.95
Bernard Brown’s experience shows how burdensome the costs of electronic monitoring, drug testing, treatment programs and other conditions of supervision can be for those sentenced to probation or community
supervision.96 Brown was on conditional release supervision after being released from prison but then reincarcerated for failing to pay $312.41 in supervision fees.97 Brown’s court record shows that when he
obtained full-time employment, he earned only $1044 per month.98 Brown’s monthly expenses included
$335 for rent, $200 for water, electricity and gas, $246 for car payment and insurance, and $21 to $50 for
medications, plus whatever he spent on food and gas. He also had to pay $35 to $225 in start-up fees for
various court-ordered sex offender treatment programs, and $25 to $30 each week for program fees.99 After
his re-incarceration, Brown finally obtained relief from federal court by bringing a habeas corpus petition pro
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se in federal court. The court took note of Brown’s low income as compared to his expenses and sent the case
back to the Florida Parole Commission with orders to grant Brown a new revocation hearing or to return
him to conditional release supervision.100
Financial burdens are particularly severe for individuals required to attend treatment classes for sex, drug,
and juvenile offenses. While FDC offers limited financial assistance for drug and juvenile offenders who do
not have the ability to pay, no such support is available for sex offender treatment. In the mid-nineties, the
Legislature revised laws governing probation and parole for sex offenders to require successful completion of
sex offender treatment at the probationer’s own expense.101 Probationers and those under community control supervision who are required to attend sex offender treatment classes must, regardless of their income,
pay out of pocket for this requirement.
The FDC contracts with private treatment statewide to provide services and fixes the amount the providers
are permitted to charge for treatment. After an initial $90 fee for an individual assessment, each class costs
$25, occurs once a week, and treatment on average lasts for two to three years.102 In addition, individuals are
required to take a minimum of one “maintenance” polygraph test a year to assess whether they have violated
their probation or post-prison release. Whether they pass the test or not, they must pay for the polygraph,
which costs at least $220.103 When an offender is unable to pay the treatment provider, the treatment provider
may eventually terminate the treatment as unsuccessful or the offender may cease showing up because he
is unable to pay for sessions. Termination of treatment then can be a basis for a violation of probation or
community release.

iv.

collection of lfos
The process of collecting LFOs from individuals convicted of crimes varies from court to court. For some
individuals sentenced to state prison, probation, or other supervision, the FDC may be responsible for collecting LFOs depending on the circuit court in which they were sentenced. In other circuits, courts require
individuals to make payments directly to the clerk of court. Those convicted of misdemeanors and criminal
traffic violations generally make payment directly to the clerk of the county court in which they were sentenced.

A.

Collections by Court System

Under increasing pressure to collect fees and fines, circuit and county courts have created a range of collection procedures. A 2007 study by the Florida Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government Accountability (“OPPAGA”) catalogued the mechanisms court clerks use to collect fines and fees. All clerks reported
using payment plans permitting individuals to pay fees and fines over time.104 Nine out of ten clerks reported
using a private collection agency,105 a practice that has become mandatory, statewide, for certain unpaid debts
as a result of legislation passed in 2009. Other mechanisms include driver’s license sanctions, liens, collection
courts, electronic fund transfers, wage garnishment, bank account garnishment, web pay point, and clerks
acting as collection agents.106
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In researching this report, it became clear that some counties engage in far more aggressive fee collection
practices than other counties. An exhaustive description of collection methods in each county is beyond the
scope of this report but we highlight here some of the more troubling collections practices we discovered.
Many of the worst impacts stem from the lack of exemptions for the indigent and the fact that judges lack
discretion to waive fees. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that it is unconstitutional to incarcerate an individual for failure to pay an LFO unless he has the ability to pay and willfully
fails to do so.107 Building upon this reasoning, Florida’s Supreme Court has held that due process principles
require that there be a determination of ability to pay before the state may “enforce the collection of costs”
because in instances where the defendant is unable to pay, a defendant could “suffer some loss of liberty or
property.”108 However, notwithstanding the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling, due process is not always forthcoming. For those unable to pay, fees are not waived;
instead payment plans are set up, but often without any
judicial determination that an individual has the ability
When individuals fail to pay, they can
to make the scheduled payment plan amounts.
suffer a range of consequences including

late fees, driver’s license suspensions
and sometimes arrest and short-term
incarceration.

When individuals fail to make payments, they may suffer a range of consequences including late fees, driver’s
license suspensions and, sometimes, arrest and shortterm incarceration if they fail to make court appearances related to the debt. These incarcerations constitute a modern variation on debtors’ prison: at root,
individuals are incarcerated for their failure or inability to make payments (though the technical reason is
failure to appear in court).
More troubling still, though much less common, some judges have incarcerated individuals directly for
failing to pay LFOs. Regardless of how the incarceration comes about, at costs of up to $100 a day in overcrowded local jails, incarceration of the poor for inability to pay LFOs is not only objectionable on moral
grounds, but also a penny-wise, pound-foolish approach.

1. Payment Plans
Payment plans permit individuals who cannot pay their legal financial obligations in full to pay these obligations over a period of time. Typically, a court sends the case to the clerk to administer a payment plan. The
judge can order enrollment in a payment plan if it has been determined that an individual is unable to pay
his financial obligations in full at the time of sentencing.109 In some counties, payments begin 30 days after
a payment plan has been established.110
State law presumes that an individual is able to pay a monthly payment of one-twelfth of 2 percent of his
annual net income, and provides that the court may review the reasonableness of a payment plan employing
this presumption.111 Yet in practice, this presumption is often ignored and payment levels are set at fixed
amounts. In Leon County, for example, persons enrolled in the collections program are expected to pay $75
a month in fees related to a felony and $50 a month for misdemeanors.112
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Payment plans, themselves, generate additional charges. State law authorizes clerks to charge debtors $25 to
enroll in the partial payment plan or an additional $5 charge per month.113 Late payments made on a partial
payment plan can result in an extra charge. In Leon and Orange Counties, for example, a $10 surcharge is
added to every delinquent monthly payment received by the court clerk.114 In Highlands County, the late
fee is $20.115

2. Collections Courts and Arrests for Failure to Pay or Appear
Some counties – including Highlands, Leon, Orange, Osceola, Sarasota and St. Lucie – have established
specialized “collections courts” to handle payment plans. Collections court hearings are typically structured
as “pay or appear” hearings. If a defendant is able to
make his payments by the payment plan deadline, there
is no requirement to appear in court. However, if he
These incarcerations constitute a modern
fails to make a payment, he must appear before the colvariation on debtors’ prison: at root, indilections court and explain why, with the possibility of
viduals are incarcerated for their failure
being held in civil contempt for failing to pay. If he
or inability to make payments (though
does not appear at that collections court hearing, a “cathe technical reason is failure to appear
pias” or “writ of bodily attachment” – a type of warrant
in court.)
that results in arrest – will typically issue and his driver’s
license will often be suspended.
The issuance of a capias writ compounds the debt owed and puts the defendant further behind in making his
payments. For example, in Orange County, the issuance of a capias costs the defendant an additional $70,
with an additional $140 charged to the defendant when he is booked and held in the Orange County jail.116
In St. Lucie County, an administrative fee of $70 is assessed when a capias writ is executed, with an additional
$60 fee when the person is booked and held in the St. Lucie County Jail.117
Supporters of collections court programs argue that they promote judicial economy by consolidating financial obligations cases under one judge and that they are also a successful way to collect payments from offenders while giving them an opportunity to be heard.118 Many view the collections program in Orange County
as a model for raising revenue. However, counties such as Palm Beach, Broward, and Miami-Dade have discontinued their collections court programs due to the operational costs. Miami-Dade County discontinued
its collections court program in 2003 due to lack of funding, and collections in the county are now handled
through private agencies.119 Broward County’s collection court program was shut down in 2006 after only a
year in operation.120 Broward’s Collection Court cost an estimated $700,000 to run.121
Often missing in the discussion is the human and societal toll that aggressive debt collection by the courts can
take. Collections court hearings take place in the middle of the week so those who are working have trouble
attending. When an individual is arrested for failure to appear in court, he invariably misses work, making
it harder to pay. Additionally, such arrests have the effect of not only draining the defendant monetarily and
psychologically, but draining their families and communities as well. While in many cases individuals find
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the money to pay “purge amounts” to get out of jail, this does not necessarily mean that they actually had the
ability to pay those costs. In many instances, an individual’s friend, family member, or employer may have
been the one to put up the money to get the person out of jail.
The following exchange from a hearing in Orange County’s Collections Court, illustrates some of these
consequences.122
Judge: “Mr. [A.], you have two cases remaining in collections court. $55 a month. Can you
pay today?”
Mr. A.: “No ma’am. I’m not currently working.”
Judge: “Why not?”
Mr. A.: “Because I lost my job.”
Judge: “How did you lose your job?”
Mr. A.: “When I went to jail about these writs.”
Judge: “Well … and whose fault is that.”
Mr. A.: “Mine.”
Judge: “I’m gonna leave them at $20 and $35 each. I won’t make your first payment due until
April 15th.”
Mr. A.: “Ok. How do I go about getting my [driver’s] license back.”
Judge: “$256.”
Mr. A.: “Ok. Thank you.”
The use of driver’s license suspensions as a sanction only makes it harder for the debtor to get back on track
and make payments. Another exchange, this one from Leon County’s Collections Court, reveals a typical
pattern.123
Mr. S.: “I’m not on the docket. I’m a walk-in because I’m trying to see if I can get my fees
waived. Is there anything you can do?”
Judge: “I can’t waive fees.”
Mr. S.: “I understand, but …”
Judge: “… What’s your name, so she can look you up in the computer.”
Mr. S.: “Michael [S.] And my license was revoked for five years. And I’m self employed. I
deliver furniture. And there’s no way I can work delivering furniture with my license
being revoked. And that’s the gist of why I can’t pay it.”
Judge: “Well, how are you supporting yourself now?”
Mr. S.: “My mom. I’ve been looking for a job, but everyone wants you to have a drivers’
license.”
Judge: “Well, day labor, work today, get paid today. Jump in the back of a truck.”
Mr. S.: “Sir?”
Judge: “Day labor. Able Body. Action Labor.”
Court clerk: “He’s got three cases. About $900 dollars.”
Judge: “Well, let’s see.”
Court clerk: “No payments made since December.”
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Judge: “If you want to do 12 days, that will wipe out what you owe. Then it would just be
reduced to a civil judgment.”
Mr. S.: “12 days where?”
Judge: “In Leon County jail.
Mr. S.: “Oooo …”
Judge: “That way you don’t have to worry about missing payments. It’s not like you’re going to
be missing work now.”
Mr. S.: “Can I do it weekends?”
Judge: “They don’t let you do … don’t let you do weekends. Either that or find a way to get
back on track.”
Mr. S.: “Can we find another way? I don’t want to get locked up.”
Judge: “All right, I’ll give you til April 1st. You got to make at least a $50 payment, all right.”
Mr. S.: “Yes sir.”
Judge: “All right, good luck to you.”
The use of capiases to arrest those who fail to appear in collections courts, with minimal procedural protections, stands in marked contrast to the more protective standards applied to those who fail to pay other debt
such as child support. In that analogous context, arrest warrants may only issue for failure to appear at a
hearing related to child support debt if:
•
•
•
•

the court has made an express finding that the alleged contemnor had notice of the hearing;
a prior order directing payment of support was entered;
that prior order included a finding that the alleged contemnor had the ability to make the payments ordered; and
the alleged contemnor has failed to pay.124

In addition, collections courts threaten to incarcerate those who have not paid without providing them with
counsel. Because the collections proceedings are styled as civil, rather than criminal, defendants are not appointed a public defender. Collections court judges rarely incarcerate people who appear before them. Yet,
those facing this threat should be guaranteed representation.
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A Closer Look at Arrests in Leon County Collections Court
The Brennan Center analyzed the impact of the Leon County Collections Court policy of arresting persons who fail to
appear at a hearing by reviewing one year’s worth of arrest data. The data reveal that the policy results in a significant
number of arrests – 838 for the year – that end up costing the court and county nearly as much as the amount raised
from those arrested. It is important to note that this analysis did not address the separate implications of the amount
of revenue raised by the collections court as a whole – which is significant – but rather focused instead on the amount
raised and the costs incurred exclusively through collections court-related arrests.125
A. The Process
At the sentencing and judgment phase of any Leon County criminal case, the judge imposes a series of statutorily
mandated court costs and fines. Each person convicted of a crime is notified to pay costs and fines immediately.
When individuals cannot pay, they are placed on a payment program, which, by statute, costs $25 to initiate and
requires payment of a designated amount each month, usually $75 a month for felony convictions and $50 a month
for misdemeanor and traffic cases. The designation of these flat monthly amounts, based on the level of offense, is at
odds with a state law on payment plans, which assumes that a person can pay roughly 2 percent of their annualized
monthly income.126 Defendants are notified that they may request an adjustment of their payment amounts from
the clerk.
Defendants are also notified that failure to pay will result in a driver’s license suspension and the issuance of an order
requiring the individual to appear in Collections Court to explain why he “should not be held in contempt of court”
for failure to pay court-ordered costs and fines. Defendants are notified that failure to appear for such a court hearing
will result in the issuance of a warrant for arrest. Collections Court takes place at an inopportune time in the middle
of work week: Tuesday afternoons at the Leon County courthouse.
B. Missed Payments
When someone misses a payment, the clerk will schedule their case for a Collections Court hearing as early as two
weeks and as long as six weeks later and mail to the last known address the notice requiring the defendant to appear
in Collections Court. In addition, the clerk issues a late notice, assesses a $10 fine, and requests suspension of the
individual’s driver’s license, all before the defendant appears in Collections Court or explains his failure to pay.
C. Failure to Appear at Collections Hearing After Missed Payment Triggers Arrest
If and when an individual misses a Collections Court date after being ordered to attend, a writ of bodily attachment or
a “blue writ” – a type of warrant – issues for the person’s arrest and an additional $20 fee is assessed for its issuance.127
When individuals are arrested, cash “purge” amounts – a payment to get out of jail immediately – are set at either
the total amount owed or $320 – whichever is less.128 This purge amount, the payment of which means immediate
freedom, is not tailored in any way to the individual’s ability to pay, as it should be under principles governing
civil contempt and constitutional safeguards against imprisonment for debt. If the defendant cannot pay the purge
amount, he must spend time in jail until being brought before a judge, typically the following day at a “first appearance
hearing” with other individuals arrested on “blue writs” and other offenses, either to work out another payment plan
or ask for release on their own recognizance.
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D. Practice Results in 838 Arrests and Over 20,000 Hours of Jail Time in One Year
We examined records for all individuals who were arrested and jailed solely for failure to appear at collections court
between October 1, 2007 and September 30, 2008.129 In that one-year period, 838 total arrests were made in Leon
County solely for failure to appear at Collections Court after failing to pay court fees and fines or falling behind in a
payment plan. Some of the individuals who were arrested had outstanding, unpaid fines or fees related to more than
one specific charge or incident.130
Most, or 650, of the arrests resulted in the defendant spending less than a full day in jail. Of those, 322 resulted in
incarceration of ten or more hours. The remaining 188 arrests resulted in defendants spending a day or longer in jail,
with 52 individuals spending between two and six days in jail, nine individuals spending nine days or longer in jail
and one individual spending more than a month behind bars.131 The median length of stay was thirteen hours, thirtyfour minutes, and fifty-two seconds. The average length of stay was twenty-four hours, fourteen minutes, and twelve
seconds.
Additionally, some individuals were arrested more than once for failing to appear at Collections Court. There were 103
such individuals. Of those, 83 were arrested twice, 17 arrested three times, and three arrested more than three times.
The 838 total arrests led to 20,310 total hours132 or 846.25 total days spent behind bars.133 Leon County spent
approximately $53.56 per day to incarcerate each individual between October of 2007 and September of 2008.134 Using
this per diem rate, the estimated cost to the county jail solely for jailing the individuals who missed Collections Court
totaled $45,325.135
Beyond jail costs, there are the added costs of executing the warrant and holding first appearance hearings in court.
It is unclear exactly how much it costs the Leon County Sheriff’s Office to execute a warrant for failure to appear in
Collections Court or how much it costs to bring each of the arrested individuals before a judge at first appearances.136
Leon County charges individuals a $20 surcharge for processing such a warrant.137 If this $20 fee can be considered a
proxy for the cost of issuing and executing the warrant, the county court would have spent $16,760 to process these
individuals.138
Therefore, not including any possible additional costs incurred in arresting individuals and bringing them before a
judge, the cost to the system for this 12-month period of arresting individuals for failure to appear at Collections
Courts was $62,085.139
These arrest-related costs are significant when compared to the amount collected from the arrested individuals. For
the year ended September 30, 2008, the court collected $80,450 in cash purges from individuals arrested on “blue
writs,” out of a total of $347,084 owed in cash purges and bonds. The median bond or purge amount owed per case
was $320; the average $282.
Five hundred and forty-two, or 65 percent, of the arrests resulted in the defendant ultimately being freed without
paying any bond or purge amount at all. The remaining 296 arrests resulted in individuals paying bonds or purge
amounts for 368 different cases (some individuals who were arrested owed money from more than one case). The
median bond or purge amount paid was $250. The average bond or purge amount paid was $218.62.
When balanced against the cost of arrests, the use of arrests only netted the county at most an additional $18,365;
indeed, for reasons noted above, the net gain, if any, is likely to be much lower since these figures do not include the
costs to the court system of holding constitutionally mandated first appearance hearings for those who have been
arrested.140
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3. Other Ways in Which Failure to Pay LFOs Can Result in Jail Time
On a number of occasions, people have been jailed directly for failing to pay their court debt (as opposed
to indirectly for failing to appear in court at a debt-related hearing). These debtors’ prison instances are far
less common than the failure to appear arrests but reveal how a lack of uniform guidance and rules creates
opportunities for dramatic injustice. For example, during a five-month period this year, a Seminole County
judge jailed more than 20 people for failing to pay court fees.141 All were released after their cases were appealed.142 In Highlands County several years ago, the public defender had to bring habeas corpus petitions to
secure the release of several people incarcerated for failure to pay their court debt.143 One man was sentenced
to 179 days in jail for failing to pay debt that originally totaled less than $750. He was released, but only
after coming to the attention of the public defender and after spending four months in jail.144 In 2005, a
state appellate court overturned a Polk County collections program on due process grounds in part because
individuals were arrested and incarcerated before any court had ever determined that they had the ability to
pay the amount owed.145
In other counties, payments are sometimes built into sentences as a condition of avoiding jail time. In
Marion County, judges routinely sentence misdemeanants who have waived their right to counsel to suspended jail sentences that automatically go into effect if LFO payments are not made.146 Such sentences
deprive defendants of a chance to show that their failure to pay LFOs was not willful, as required by the
Constitution.147
In Alachua County, arrest warrants are regularly issued to people who have been convicted of minor offenses
(such as drinking from an open container in public) and who subsequently fail to pay fines and court costs.
Warrants issue automatically when failure to make a payment occurs without any prior hearing at which
defendants have an opportunity to explain their failure to pay.148
Hinging jail sentences on required payments of LFOs makes it nearly inevitable that indigent offenders will
be unable to avoid jail time, since they cannot afford to pay the required amounts by the state-imposed deadline. When court costs, fees, and fines must be paid to avoid automatic time in jail, courts should be precluded from incarcerating individuals unless and until a determination of “willful refusal to pay” is made.149

4. Overuse of Driver’s License Suspensions Hinders Ability to Repay Debts
Suspension of an individual’s driver’s license is one of the most common penalties in Florida for failure to pay
court-ordered legal financial obligations.150 Court clerks routinely request that the Department of Highway
Safety and Motor Vehicles suspend a person’s driver’s license for non-payment of court-assessed financial obligations, without any prior determination that the defendant had an ability to pay.151 The clerk is authorized
under Florida law to charge the offender $7 in order to file the request.152 State law provides that restoring a
driver’s license costs an additional $60.153
The use of driver’s license suspensions causes hardship for those unable to pay and, ironically, further hinders
their ability to pay their debt because they are unable to drive legally to work. A 2007 Milwaukee study,
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for example, found that a valid driver’s license was a more accurate predictor of sustained employment than
a General Educational Development (GED) diploma among public assistance recipients.154 The study also
found that public assistance participants are twice as likely to be employed above the poverty level when they
have a driver’s license.155
Moreover, due to the interaction with existing criminal sanctions for driving on a suspended license, the
practical consequences of this enforcement mechanism are often harsher to individuals and more costly
to the state than expected or intended. Under Florida law, a person commits a misdemeanor when he or
she knowingly drives with a suspended license.156 On the third or subsequent conviction, the person commits a felony – and is considered a “habitual traffic offender” – punishable by up to five years in prison and
a $5000 fine.157 In 2008, the Legislature amended
the law to exclude from this felony category persons
whose driver’s licenses were suspended for failure to
Suspension of a driver’s license is one of
pay LFOs and who have no prior “forcible felony
the most common penalties in Florida for
conviction[s].”158 Even under the new rule, however,
failure to pay LFOs. It causes hardship for
these individuals still face significant jail time – up to
those unable to pay and further hinders
one year – and steep fines of up to $1000.159

their ability to pay their debt because they
are unable to drive legally to work.

In 2007, a year before the amendment, the Florida
Office of Program Policy Analysis and Government
Accountability found that nearly three-quarters of the
661 records they reviewed of persons incarcerated in state prison for the primary offense of driving on a suspended license “were in prison for the underlying offense of driving while their license had been suspended
for failure to meet court-ordered financial obligations.”160 The costs associated with these detentions are far
from trivial. With average sentence lengths of 2.3 years,161 hundreds of individuals have lost their freedom
for what is, at base, their inability to pay financial legal obligations. While the July 2008 amendment to the
suspended license statute is certainly a step in the right direction, more reform is needed to address the costs
and consequences of this practice. Although the amendment creates an exemption from the felony designation, individuals who lose their licenses due to LFOs, and are then convicted of driving with a suspended
license, still face significant and costly jail terms.162

5. Private Collections Agencies Add Up To 40 Percent Surcharge on Debt
The use of private collections agencies is an increasingly common collections method. In 2009, the Legislature required clerks to use collection agents for uncollected fees after 90 days.163 Before forwarding the matter to a private attorney or collections agency, the clerk of the court must first attempt to collect the unpaid
amount through “cost-effective” collections process established by the court.164 Under Florida law, a private
attorney or collections agent hired by the court clerk can add up to a 40 percent surcharge to the amounts it
collects from delinquent payments.165
In some places, this automatic transfer has severe unintended consequences. In Orange County, for example,
the court clerk automatically suspended the driver’s licenses in cases that were transferred to a private debt
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collector. The clerk will only restore those licenses once full payment to the private debt collector has been
made. This practice expands tremendously the number of those with license suspensions stemming from
failure to pay their court debts. Previously, those making payments under a payment plan were able to avoid
license suspensions. Now, the debtor must pay the collection agency in full before the clerk will restore a
driver’s license.
This full payment requirement is having severe consequences for those unable to pay. Sam, whose last name
has been omitted at his request, had been making regular payments on his total debt of about $4,000 in
Orange County Collections Court.166 When his debt was transferred to a collection agency, Alliance One,
his license was immediately suspended and he was told it would only be restored when his total debt was
paid off. In addition, Sam says that the agency is incorrectly seeking an additional $44,705 in restitution
that was previously voided by the court. However,
Under Florida law, a private attorney or
now that the matter is in private hands, Sam has been
collections agent hired by the court clerk
unable to appeal this error anywhere. In addition,
can add up to a 40 percent surcharge to
he now faces a 30 percent surcharge on the inflated
the amounts it collects from delinquent
amount, bringing his debt to nearly $64,000. In the
payments.
meantime, restoration of his driver’s license, which is
key to his livelihood, hangs in the balance.
The 40 percent maximum surcharge added by private debt collectors is, by any measure, extreme. There are
some counties, however, that do not allow the agent to charge the maximum. For example, in Pasco County,
the authorized surcharge amount has been limited to 25 percent out of concern for overburdening offenders.167 However, even this more limited surcharge amounts to a significant burden.

6. Additional Collection Mechanisms
In addition to the mechanisms discussed above, a court can enter judgment for court-imposed financial obligations in the form of a civil lien and can enforce the judgment in the same manner allowed in civil cases.168
Civil restitution liens can also be imposed by court order for the payment of restitution, incarceration costs,
or other correctional costs.169 A lien can be entered in favor of crime victims, the state, its local subdivisions,
or an aggrieved party and attaches against the real or personal property owned by a convicted offender.170 A
civil restitution lien continues for 20 years after the date of entry and carries a rate of interest determined by
the Chief Financial Officer of Florida. That rate of interest is determined on the date of entry of the civil
restitution lien and remains the same as long as the lien remains.171 Civil restitution liens do not preclude a
court from imposing civil judgment liens for other costs, such as court costs, fines, and fees.172
Less popular collection methods used by courts to collect financial obligations include wage and bank account garnishment, clerks acting as collection agents, electronic funds transfer, and conversion of financial
obligations into community service.173
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Under Florida law, a judge is permitted to convert statutory financial obligations into court-imposed
community service for those who cannot pay and, on paper, the community service option provides an
escape hatch for the indigent. 174 However, it appears that in practice, courts seldom use it. In a report
from court clerks, only 16 of 67 counties reported converting any mandatory LFOs imposed in
felony cases to community service.175 Of those
On paper, the community service option
16 that did report using community service, 10
provides an escape hatch for the indigent.
converted less than $3000 of mandatory LFOs to
However, it appears that in practice, courts
community service in one year.176

seldom use it.

B.

Department of Corrections Collections

The Florida Department of Corrections collects from those under its supervision - persons on probation,
parole or other community supervision - when the circuit in which they were sentenced so orders. In fiscal
year 2008-2009, FDC collected $25.05 million from supervision fees, $52.1 million from restitution, fines
and court costs, and $18.7 million from subsistence and other court-ordered payments.177
For those who are serving prison time, outstanding LFOs can be collected from inmate accounts if the attorney who prosecuted the action files a copy of judgment with the FDC.178 If there is sufficient money in
the inmate’s account, an FDC officer can write a check directly from the account.179 If there is not, the FDC
partially pays the debt, and then allots any additional deposits to the debt until it is satisfied.180
For those on probation, parole, or other community supervision, the collection process varies, depending on
whether the sentencing court or Parole Commission has ordered a specific monthly payment amount or, as
is more common, listed a total amount of fees, fines and restitution to be paid. If the sentencing court or
Parole Commission has ordered a specific monthly payment amount, and the probationer fails to make that
monthly payment, the probation officer must report the failure to pay to the court or commission.181 The
Parole Commission, and some judges, permit officers to use a technical violation notification letter to report
this type of violation in lieu of issuing a warrant for the probationer’s arrest.182
If the sentencing court does not specify a monthly payment amount, as is more common, FDC will arrive at
a monthly payment amount by dividing the total dollar amount of all court-ordered fees, fines, and restitution by the number of months of probation or other supervision. FDC then adds a probation supervision
fee – $50 a month if an individual was declared indigent and/or had a public defender – plus a 4 percent
surcharge.183 Florida law requires the entire monthly payment to be applied first to the individual’s restitution obligation until the full restitution debt is satisfied.184
One problem with this method of calculating monthly payments is that it does not necessarily relate to the
probationer’s ability to pay, as required by state law.185 As a result, persons on probation can be burdened
with monthly payments beyond their means, as is illustrated by the story of Wayne B. Mr. B. reported to
probation the day after his release from prison in March 2006 and learned that he owed a total of $14,000
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in debt, which he was ordered to pay off at $388 per month as a condition of probation.186 Mr. B. explained
to his probation officer that he could not make payments at this amount, but he was told that the payments
were set by dividing his total debt by the number of months of his probation term. Unable to find an attorney to assist him in his efforts to reduce his payments, Mr. B. filed pro se motions in his sentencing court
requesting that his debt be converted into a civil lien (which would become a debt collectible through civil
means) rather than a condition of his probation, violation of which could lead to re-incarceration. The
Court denied those motions. When interviewed, Mr. B. feared that his probation term would be extended
beyond the three years to which he was sentenced because of inability to make all his payments on time.
When a monthly payment amount is set by FDC and not the sentencing court, a missed monthly payment
cannot trigger a violation of probation; instead, a violation may only occur if at the end of his probation
term, a probationer has not paid off the total amount of court-ordered payments.187 At that point, if a judge
finds that the failure to pay was willful, he may either extend the supervision period or revoke probation and
sentence the individual to additional prison time.188 Revocation solely for failure to pay financial obligations
is very rare. From January 1, 2007 through June 30, 2008, 19 persons had their probations revoked and were
sentenced to prison for failure to pay fees or restitution only.189  More commonly, failure to pay is included
as an additional violation when other violations are alleged.190
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v.

recommendations
Florida’s system for imposing and collecting fees involves multiple players at various levels of government.
Many of the problems described in this report stem from the Legislature’s decision not to exempt the indigent. As a result, collection efforts trigger additional hardships that, in turn, further undermine the ability of
persons in debt to pay. At its worst, the process results in costly arrests and jail time unrelated to public safety.
The Legislature, the court system, the clerks, the Florida Department of Corrections, and county commissions all have a role to play in moving toward reform. We outline below a number of recommendations to
address the hidden costs – both human and financial – of Florida’s criminal justice fee system.

Immediate steps:
1.

The Legislature should exempt indigent defendants from LFOs. An exemption system based on a
rational determination of ability to pay would free officials from the burden of pursing non-existent
revenue and would relieve financial pressure on previously incarcerated individuals who are attempting
to re-enter society. In light of the fact that performance standards expect only a 9 percent collection
rate for felonies, an indigency exemption in felony cases would result in little lost revenue.

2.

Payment plans should be tailored to an individual’s ability to pay, as state law already requires.
At minimum, the courts should follow the state law that presumes a person is unable to pay more
than 2 percent of average monthly income when setting payment plans. Similarly, the Department
of Corrections should sync monthly payments to income and should fully exempt the indigent from
monthly probation supervision fees, consistent with existing state law.

3.

Florida’s Supreme Court should adopt court rules to end the new debtors’ prison. In the absence
of a prior finding that an individual can pay fees, courts should not authorize incarceration for failure
to appear at LFO debt hearings. This would be consistent with the rules that apply to those who
have failed to pay child support. The Court should also adopt rules to ensure that incarceration for
contempt does not occur as a result of inability to pay.

4.

Counties can save money by eliminating debt-related arrests for failure to appear and resulting
incarceration in already overcrowded local jails. In the absence of a statewide rule, counties with
collections hearings can change local practices to eliminate these arrests and jail stays, which are unrelated to public safety and cost taxpayers money.

5.

Florida should provide counsel in all collections or LFO-related collection contempt proceedings
that may result in incarceration. It should not be possible to end up in prison for LFO debt without
having been represented by counsel.

6.

Courts should offer community service programs that build job skills to all those who cannot
viably afford to repay fees. While state law authorizes community service as an alternative to payment for those unable to pay, very few courts actually provide this option.
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7.

The performance standards used to evaluate court clerks should be based on collection costs as
well as collection rates. Current practice only looks at one side of the ledger – the revenue raised –
without considering the expenses of collection. Performance standards should also include compliance
with state law and constitutional requirements related to collection of fees.

8.

Court clerks should suspend driver’s licenses only in those cases in which an individual can afford to repay court debt but refuses to do so. In addition, the Legislature should create a conditional driver’s license that permits driving to and from work for those whose licenses have been suspended.

9.

The Legislature should limit service charges by private debt collectors and ensure adequate oversight. Once court debt is turned over to private firms for collection, the amount owed increases as
surcharges are added, yet current oversight of collection practices is scant.

Longer-term reforms:
1.

The Legislature should reconsider levying LFOs in felony cases – in which collection rates are
extremely low, in any event – without a full understanding of how the debt may affect an individual’s attempt to re-enter his/her community. People with felony convictions are likely to have
limited financial and employment prospects; increased debt burden after release from prison may well
increase the risk of recidivism.

2.

Reforms must ensure that counties and others do not bear hidden costs of state revenue collection. For a number of counties, the fee system requires expenditures for collections, particularly
the arrest and incarceration of non-payers, and increases the dockets of their already overburdened
court systems. These costs are passed on to taxpayers at the local level. While the state gets a revenue
enhancement from fee collection, the ledger sheet for other Floridians may well be in the red. A new
source of revenue only works if it does not result in hidden costs. Counties and other stakeholders
should be engaged to determine if the revenue enhancement of the existing system outweighs the costs
of collection, both actual as well as social, and the fee system should be reformed accordingly.
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appendix: lfos established by florida law
Fines & Assessments with a Punitive Purpose
A. Fines According to the Severity of the Crime
Description

Amount

Source

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Where the Money Goes

Juveniles?

General fines for felonies,
misdemeanors and
non-criminal violations
designated crimes

Up to $500 to $15,000, or higher under
certain circumstances

Fla. Stat. § 775.083(1)

Discretionary

Fine & Forfeiture Fund of the circuit
court. See Fla. Stat. § 142.01.

No

Fine for crime that resulted
in injury or death

Up to $10,000

Fla. Stat. § 775.0835(1)

Discretionary. May be
imposed only if defendant
has “present ability to pay.”

Crimes Compensation Trust Fund.

No

B. Fines for Specific Crimes or Categories of Crimes
Description

Amount

Source

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Where the Money Goes

Juveniles?

Driving Under the
Influence

$500 to $5,000

Fla. Stat. § 316.193

Mandatory, within dollar
range in statute.

Fine & Forfeiture Fund of the circuit
court. See Fla. Stat. § 142.01.

No

Boating Under the
Influence

$60 plus fines similar to those for DUI.

Fla. Stat. § 327.35(1), (9)

Mandatory

Brain and Spinal Cord Injury
Rehabilitation Trust Fund, after
5% is deducted by the clerk for
administrative costs.

No

No

Reckless Driving

$30 to $1,005

Fla. Stat. § § 316.192(1)–(4)

Mandatory, within dollar
range in statute

$5 to Emergency Medical Services
Trust Fund. $1 from every civil
penalty to Child Welfare Training
Trust Fund; $1 to Juvenile Justice
Training Trust Fund; first $300,000
collected to the Grants and
Donations Trust Fund for foster
care citizen review panels; then
20.6%to General Revenue Fund of
the state; 7.2% for the Emergency
Medical Services Trust Fund; 5.1%
for the Additional Court Cost
Clearing Trust Fund; 8.2% to the
to the Brain and Spinal Cord Injury
Rehabilitation Trust Fund; 2% to the
Florida Endowment Foundation for
Vocational Rehabilitation; 0.5% to
the clerk of court for administrative
costs. See Fla. Stat. §§ 142.03,
316.660, 318.21.

Drug Trafficking

$25,000 to $500,000

Fla. Stat. § 893.135(1)

Mandatory

Florida Drug, Device, and Cosmetic
Trust Fund. Fla. Stat. § 499.066(4).

No

Drug Offense Within
1,000 Feet of Certain
Facilities

$500

Fla. Stat. § 893.13

Mandatory

Florida Drug, Device, and Cosmetic
Trust Fund. Fla. Stat. § 499.066(4).

No

Aggravated White Collar
Crime

Greater of $500,000 or double the value
of the pecuniary gain or loss

Fla. Stat. § 775.0844(7)

Discretionary

Unspecified but presumably goes to
Fine & Forfeiture Fund of the circuit
court. See Fla. Stat. §§ 142.01(1)(f ),

No

Mandatory

Circuit court administrator to
pay administrative costs of certain
treatment-based drug court
programs.

No

Solicitation of Prostitution

$500

Fla. Stat. § 796.07(6)
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Description

Amount

Source

Graffiti

$250 to $1,000

Supplemental Fine for
Theft for Those Found
Guilty of a Cluster of
Theft, Dealing in Stolen
Property, and Related
Offenses

Up to twice the gross value gained or
twice the gross loss caused, whichever is
greater, plus the cost of investigation and
prosecution

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Where the Money Goes

Juveniles?

Fla. Stat. §§ 806.13(6)(a)–(c)

Discretionary. The court
may decline to order fine
if it finds person unable
to pay

Unspecified but presumably goes to
Fine & Forfeiture Fund of the circuit
court. See Fla. Stat. § 142.01(1)(f ).

Yes

Fla. Stat. § 812.032

Discretionary. The state
attorney has the discretion
to file a motion calling for
the fine.

Unspecified but presumably goes to
Fine & Forfeiture Fund of the circuit
court. See Fla. Stat. § 142.01(1)(f ).

No

Unspecified but presumably goes to
Fine & Forfeiture Fund of the circuit
court. See Fla. Stat. § 142.01(1)(f ).

No

Second Conviction of Theft
From Merchant

$50 to $1,000

Fla. Stat. § 812.015(2)

Mandatory. However, the
court may convert the fine
into the number of hours
of public service that would
satisfy the fine at minimum
wage.

Engaging in Continuing
Criminal Enterprise

$500,000

Fla. Stat. § 893.20(2)

Discretionary

Florida Drug, Device, and Cosmetic
Trust Fund. Fla. Stat. § 499.066(4).

No

Fla. Stat. §§ 896.101(6), (7)

Fine discretionary; civil
penalty mandatory.

Unspecified but presumably goes to
Fine & Forfeiture Fund of the circuit
court. See Fla. Stat. § 142.01(1)(f ).

No

Fla. Stat. § 379.403

Mandatory

Paid to the Fish and Wildlife
Conservation Commission’s State
Game Trust Fund.

No

Mandatory

Unspecified by statute but
presumably goes to Fine & Forfeiture
Fund of the circuit court. (See Fla.
Stat. § 142.01(1)(f )).

No

First offense: a fine not exceeding
$250,000 or twice the value of the
transaction, whichever is greater.
Money Laundering

Illegal Killing, Taking,
Possessing, or Selling
Wldlife or Game
Theft of any Commercially
Farmed Animal, including
any Aquaculture Species

Second or subsequent offense: a fine
not exceeding $500,000 or quintuple
the value of the transaction, whichever
is greater. A money launderer is also
liable for a civil penalty of the value of
the transaction or $25,000, whichever
is greater
$250 for each violation

$10,000

Fla. Stat § 812.014(2)(c)(7)

Penalties With a Restitution Purpose
Description

Amount

Source

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Where the Money Goes

Juveniles?

Fla. Stat. § 775.089(1)(a)(1)–
(1)(a)(2)

Discretionary. A court
not ordering restitution
must state in detail clear
and compelling reasons
if it decides not to order
restitution.

The victim.

Yes

Civil Restitution Lien
Against Offender’s Current
and Future Assets

Damages to victim and costs to state or
local subdivisions for incarceration and
correctional costs. Damages to the state
for correctional costs are: for a capital or
life felony, the offender is a liable in the
liquidated damage amount of $250,000;
for other offenses, a liquidated damage
amount of $50 per day of the sentence
shall be assessed against the offender.

Fla. Stat. §§ 960.291–960.293.

Mandatory

Crime victims, the state, its local
subdivisions, and other aggrieved
parties.

No

Costs of initial Forensic
Physical Examination for
Sexual Offense

The amount that the Crime Victims’
Services Office paid to the medical
provider up to $500.

Fla. Stat. § 960.28(5)

Mandatory

Crimes Compensation Trust Fund.

Yes

Theft from a Person 65 or
Older of More Than $1000

Amount of loss plus up to 500 hours of
community service.

Fla. Stat. § 812.0145(1)

Mandatory

The victim.

No

Killing or Injury to a
Horse or Cow

The greater of up to twice the gross fair
market value or up to twice the gross
loss caused plus attorney’s fees and any
related costs.

Fla. Stat. § 828.125(4)

Discretionary

Aggrieved party.

No

Restitution

Damage or loss caused directly or
indirectly by the defendant’s offense and
criminal episode.
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Assessments with a Public Cost Recovery Purpose – Court Costs
A. Fees Associated With Any Offense
Description

Amount

Source

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Where the Money Goes

Offender Fee

$3

Fla. Stat. § 938.01(1)

Mandatory

Additional Court Cost Clearing Trust Fund to be distributed as
follows: 92% to Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice
Standards and Training Trust Fund. 6.3% to Department of Law
Enforcement Operating Trust Fund for the Criminal Justice Grant
Program. 1.7% to Department of Children and Family Services
Domestic Violence Trust Fund for the domestic violence program.

Offender Fee

$50

Fla. Stat. § 938.03(1)

Mandatory

$49 to the Crimes Compensation Trust Fund. $1 retained by the
clerk of the court. Fla. Stat. §§ 775.0835(2), 938.03(4)

Additional Court Cost on
Criminal Fines

5% surcharge imposed on fines
for criminal offenses and certain
traffic infractions

Fla. Stat. § 938.04

Mandatory

Crimes Compensation Trust Fund.

Additional Court Costs for
Felonies, Misdemeanors, and
Criminal Traffic Offenses

$60 (for criminal traffic offense
or misdemeanor) to $225 (for
felony).

Fla. Stat. § 938.05

Mandatory

Fine and forfeiture fund to be used by the clerk for court-related
functions.

Additional Cost for Crime
Stoppers Programs

$20

Fla. Stat. § 938.06

Mandatory

$17 to Crime Stoppers Trust Fund (which funds programs in the
circuit that set up tip lines and offer rewards for reporting crimes).
$3 to clerk of court as service charge.

Crime Prevention Cost

$50 (for a felony) or $20 (for
any other offense)

Fla. Stat. § 775.083(2)

Mandatory

Crime prevention programs in the county, including safe
neighborhood programs.

Offender Fee

$2

Fla. Stat. § 938.15

Mandatory (if
authorized by local
government)

To the county for criminal justice education degree programs and
training courses, including basic recruit training, for their respective
officers and employing agency support personnel.

Costs for Teen Courts

Up to $3

Fla. Stat. § 938.19(2)

Mandatory (if
authorized by county)

To Teen court for operation and administration, less 5% retained by
clerk for administrative costs.

Offender Fee

Up to $65 and a lien against
personal property.

Fla. Stat. § 939.185(1)(a)

Mandatory (if
adopted by county)

25% to supplement state funding for the state courts system and
county funding for local requirements; 25% to assist counties in
providing legal aid programs; 25% to fund public law library; 25%
to support teen court and other juvenile alternative programs.

Offender Fee

$85 and a lien against personal
property.

Fla. Stat. § 939.185(1)
(b)

Mandatory (if
adopted by county)

Fine & Forfeiture Fund of the circuit court.

County Court Fee

$10 against the non-prevailing
party if the defendant does not
contest the violation in court,
$40 against the non-prevailing
party if the defendant does
contest the violation.

Fla. Stat. § 34.045(1)
(b)–(1)(c)

Mandatory

The $10 fee goes to the county or municipality. The $40 contest fee
is deposited in the Fine & Forfeiture Fund of the circuit court.

Brennan Center for Justice | 29

Description

Amount

Source

Costs on Conviction

Costs of prosecution, including
investigative costs incurred by
law enforcement agencies, if
requested by such agencies.
Costs may include the salaries
of permanent employees.
Minimum cost for state
prosecutor is no less than $50
for misdemeanor or criminal
traffic case and no less than
$100 for felony. Court “may
set a higher amount upon a
showing of sufficient proof of
higher costs incurred.” Costs
are imposed “notwithstanding
the defendant’s present ability
to pay.” Case law shows that
as much as $1,244 has been
imposed as a total fee in this
category. Castrillon v. State, 821
So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2002).

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Where the Money Goes

Fla. Stat. § 938.27

Mandatory.

Returned to the investigative agency that incurred the expense;
funds recovered for state agencies deposited in the agency operating
trust fund; funds recovered by the Department of Law Enforcement
deposited in the department’s Forfeiture and Investigative Support
Trust Fund; funds recovered on behalf of state attorney to go to
Grants and Donations Trust Fund.

Cost of Public Defender

A defendant who received the
assistance of a public defender
and was convicted “shall be
liable for payment of . . .
attorney’s fees and costs.” The
minimum charge is $50 for a
misdemeanor or criminal traffic
case and $100 for a felony case,
though “[t]he court may set a
higher amount upon a showing
of sufficient proof of higher fees
or costs incurred” Case law
shows that as much as$1,000
has been imposed as a total fee
in this category. Castrillon v.
State, 821 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2002).

Fla. Stat. § 938.29(1)(a)

Mandatory,
but,amount to be
determined by court.
The court is not
required to examine
the defendant’s
ability to pay before
imposing costs. Cook
v. State, 896 So. 2d
870, 872–73 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(rejecting claim that
courts must examine
ability to pay costs
before imposing them
but not addressing
determination of
ability to pay when
collecting costs).

Indigent Criminal Defense Fund.

Public Defender Application
Fee

$50

Fla. Stat. § 27.52(1)
(b)–(1)(c)

Mandatory

98% to the Indigent Criminal Defense Trust Fund. 2% to the clerk.

B. Fees for Specific Crimes or Categories of Crimes
Description

Amount

Source

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Where the Money Goes

Cost for Driving or Boating
Under the Influence

$135

Fla. Stat. § 938.07

Mandatory

$25 to the Emergency Medical Services Trust Fund, $50 to the
Operating Trust Fund of the Department of Law Enforcement to be
used for operational expenses in conducting the statewide criminal
analysis laboratory system, and $60 to the Brain and Spinal Cord
Injury Rehabilitation Trust Fund.

Additional Costs Assessed
in Domestic Violence Cases
to Fund Domestic Violence
Programs

$201

Fla. Stat. § 938.08

Mandatory

$85 to the Domestic Violence Trust Fund. $115 to the governing
board of the county to pay for costs of incarcerating persons for
domestic violence and provide additional domestic violence training
to law enforcement personnel. $1 service charge to clerk’s office.

Additional Cost Assessed in
Various Assault and Battery
Offenses to Fund Rape Crisis
Centers

$151

Fla. Stat. § 938.085

Mandatory

$150 to the Rape Crisis Program Trust Fund in the Department of
Health. $1 service charge to clerk’s office.
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Description

Amount

Source

Mandatory or
Discretionary

Where the Money Goes

Additional Court Cost
Imposed for Crimes Against
Minors and other Certain
Crimes

$151

Fla. Stat. § 938.10

Mandatory

$50 to Department of Children and Family Services’ Grants
and Donations Trust Fund for disbursement to the Office of
the Statewide Guardian Ad Litem. $100 for Department of
Children and Family Services’ Grants and Donations Trust Fund
for disbursement to the Florida Network of Children’s Advocacy
Centers, Inc. $1 service charge to clerk’s office.

Misdemeanor Convictions
Involving Drugs or Alcohol

$15

Fla. Stat. § 938.13

Mandatory
(if imposed by local
government)

$14 to County Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Trust Fund for
allocation to local substance abuse programs. $1 service charge to
clerk’s office.

Costs Assessed in Certain
Drug and Alcohol-Related
Offenses for Alcohol and
Drug Abuse Programs

Up to the amount of the fine
authorized for the underlying
alcohol or drug related offenses.
For example, a cost of $1,000
can be imposed on someone
convicted of a second DUI.

Fla. Stat. § 938.21

Discretionary (within
statutory limit)

County Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse trust fund for drug abuse
treatment or education program. Fla. Stat. § 893.165.

Costs for Assistance Grants
for Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Programs

Up to amount of fine for
certain alcohol and drug related
offenses. For example, the
assessment can be $1,000 for
a second DUI or $5,000 for
drug possession. See Fla. Stat. §
893.13 (6)(a) (drug possession
is a third degree felony) ; §
775.083(1)(c) (third-degree
felonies warrant a $5,000 fine).

Fla. Stat. § 938.23

Discretionary (within
statutory limit)

County Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Trust Fund or the
Department of Children and Family Services’ Grants and Donations
Trust Fund.

Fee Imposed for Conviction
of Controlled Substance
Offense

$100 (plus an additional
assessment if the court finds
that the defendant has the
ability to pay and will not be
prevented by such payment
from rehabilitation or from
paying restitution).

Fla. Stat. § 938.25

Discretionary

Operating Trust Fund of the Department of Law Enforcement to be
used by the statewide criminal analysis laboratory system.

Surcharge for Criminal Traffic
Violations

Up to $30

Fla. Stat. § 318.18(13)

Mandatory (if
imposed by local
government)

To fund state court facilities. Up to 25% may be used for local law
libraries.

Surcharge for Criminal Traffic
Violations

Up to $15

Fla. Stat. § 318.18(14)

Mandatory (if
imposed by local
government)

To replace fine revenue deposited in the clerk’s fine and forfeiture
fund.

“Administrative fee” for
noncriminal traffic violations.

$12.50

Fla. Stat. § 318.18(18)

Mandatory

Fine & Forfeiture Fund of the circuit court.

Surcharge to Secure Payment
of County Bonds Related to
Criminal Traffic Violations

Up to the amount of the
amount of the annual payment
of the bonds divided by the
number of traffic citations paid
each year

Fla. Stat. § 318.18(13)
(a)(3)

Mandatory (if
imposed by local
government)

To pay the debt service on the bonds or to fund state court facility
construction projects.
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Assessments with a Public Cost Recovery Purpose – Punishment
Description

Amount

Subsistence Costs at State
Facilities

Unspecified. Statute allows
for “all or a fair portion of the
prisoner’s daily subsistence
costs, based upon the inmate’s
ability to pay, the liability or
potential liability of the inmate
to the victim or the guardian or
the estate of the victim, and the
needs of his or her dependents.”

Source

Mandatory or Discretionary

Where the Money Goes

Fla. Stat. § 944.485.
Payment is a condition
of parole. Ivory v.
Wainwright, 393 So. 2d
542, 544 (Fla. 1980).

Mandatory. The charge is to be assessed
by the Florida Parole and Probation
Commission, see Gerlock v. Fla. Parole
& Prob. Comm’n, 411 So. 2d 1386 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1982), except for those
inmates who have entered into a Mutual
Participation agreement prior to Oct. 1,
1978 (allowing inmates to work at the
prison).

To the correctional facility.

Subsistence Costs at Local
Facilities

Unspecified. Statute permits
local jails to charge “all or a fair
portion of . . .daily subsistence
costs.” A $10 booking fee and
$2 daily subsistence fee have
been upheld as permissible.
Solomos v. Jenne, 776 So. 2d
953, 954 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2000).

Fla. Stat. § 951.033

Discretionary (decision made by Chief
Correctional Officer)

Detention facility.

Reimbursement for Medical
Expenses

Costs of providing medical
care, treatment, hospitalization,
or transportation from the
prisoner by deducting from
the prisoner’s cash account and
placing a lien against personal
property.

Fla. Stat. § 951.032

Discretionary (decision made by
Correctional Facility)

Detention facility.

Probation Costs

Total sum of “money equal to
the total month or portion of
a month of supervision times
the court-ordered amount,
but not to exceed the actual
per diem cost of supervision.”
Costs of supervision generally
are $103.72 for probationers
and $124.71 for those under
community control. If an
individual is declared indigent
by the sentencing or releasing
authority, either in open court
or by having used the public
defender, the rate will generally
be established at $50 per
month.

Fla. Stat. § 948.09(1)(a)
(1); Florida Department
of Corrections
correspondence

Discretionary (decision made by the
Court)

General Revenue Fund.

Surcharge on collection of
LFOs by Florida Department
of Corrections

4% of total owed.

Fla. Stat. § 945.31

Discretionary (decision made by FDC)

Operating Trust Fund.

Additional Probation
Surcharge for Felony
Offenders.

$2 per month.

Fla. Stat. § 948.09(1)
(a)(2)

Mandatory (but, the FDC may exempt a
person based on statutory factors)

Department of Corrections; to be used for
correctional probation officers’ training and
equipment.

Misdemeanor Probation
Costs

Any person placed on
misdemeanor probation by a
county court must contribute
no less than $40 per month. It
is a condition of probation.

Fla. Stat. § 948.09(1)(b)

$40 minimum is mandatory. (However, a
larger assessment is up to the discretion of
the sentencing court. FDC may exempt a
person based on statutory factors).

Court-approved public or private entity
providing misdemeanor supervision.
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Description

Amount

Source

Mandatory or Discretionary

Where the Money Goes

Electronic Monitoring Costs

Any person being electronically
monitored must pay, as a
condition of probation, a
surcharge up to the full cost
of the monitoring service,
in addition to the cost of
supervision as directed by a
sentencing court.

Fla. Stat. § 948.09(2)

Discretionary. (Decision made by
the sentencing court and there is no
minimum. FDC may exempt a person
based on statutory factors).

General Revenue Fund.

Costs for Out-of-State
Parolees and Probationers

Each out-of-state probationer
or parolee transferred to Florida
must contribute at least $30
per month

Fla. Stat. § 948.09(5)

Discretionary (FDC may exempt a person
based on statutory factors).

Department of Corrections.

Urinalysis Costs

Offenders under any type
of supervision to submit to
and pay for urinalysis, as a
condition of probation.

Fla. Stat. § 948.09(6)

Discretionary (decision made by the
FDC).

Pays for urinalysis.

Residential Drug Punishment
Center Costs

An offender ordered to
probation at a community
residential drug punishment
center must pay a fee for room
and board and residential
supervision. The court may
also require the offender to
participate in and pay for
substance abuse treatment or
random drug testing.

Fla. Stat. § 948.034(1)(a)

Mandatory, if the court requires placement
in residential center.

Not specified.

Residential Drug Treatment
Fines

$500 to $10,000

Fla. Stat. § 948.034(1)
(a)(1); Fla. Stat. §
775.083(1)(c)

Mandatory, if the court requires placement
in residential center.

Fine and Forfeiture Fund of the circuit court.

DUI: Treatment Costs

The court must require a
DUI offender to complete
a substance abuse program;
if the program recommends
substance abuse treatment, the
offender must pay reasonable
costs for education, evaluation
and treatment.

Fla. Stat. § 316.193(5)

Mandatory, if substance abuse program
recommends treatment.

Service provider.

DUI: Punishment Costs

In DUI cases, the court must
“as a condition of probation,
order the impoundment or
immobilization of the vehicle
that was operated by or in the
actual control of the defendant
or any one vehicle registered
in the defendant’s name at
the time of impoundment or
immobilization.”

Fla. Stat. § 316.193(6)

Mandatory

Pays for impoundment and ignition interlock
device.

Processing Fees For Inmate
Banking Services

Up to $6 per month

Fla. Admin. Code Ann.
R.33-203.201(1)(h)

Mandatory, but waived for veterans of
U.S. Armed Forces

Not specified.

Room & Board at Probation
and Restitution Centers

Up to $25 per day

Fla. Admin. Code Ann.
R.33-504.101(5)(a)

Mandatory

Not specified.
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